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Summary: This article looks beyond economic and institutional factors to address the role of 
corporate founder-CEO values when determining ownership structures and corporate 
governance mechanisms. We take the Upper-Echelons Theory as our central premise, 
according to which a firm reflects the experience and values of those occupying its senior 
executive positions, to explain the existence and persistence of certain atypical methods (with 
reference to the dominant model), in matters of corporate governance. The Auchan Group 
represents one such atypical case and provides a concrete example of the effects of a 
particular value system and how its conception of ownership affects its governance model. In 
particular, in the case of Auchan, it appears that the evolution of the ownership structure is not 
dictated by the need to protect shareholder rights, but rather it follows a value system which 
considers that corporate ownership and its related rights come with a lasting responsibility to 
the firm’s staff. 
 
Keywords: value system, concept of ownership, corporate governance. 
 
Can we reasonably neglect the (moral and religious) values of corporate upper 
echelons when seeking to explain the choice of a capitalist structure and the implementation 
of a corporate governance system? In fact, the currently dominant approach to governance 
offers an essentially technical explanation of the phenomenon, based on the ability of a 
particular method to minimize agency costs.  
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This explanation was significantly inspired by the work of Berle and Means (1932), 
published after the Wall Street crash of 1929, which explained that a great deal of dysfunction 
in major publicly traded companies was due to the separation of ownership and control, the 
former being typically held by numerous shareholders, the latter exercised by a small number 
of salaried directors. Berle and Means showed that the separation of these functions, creating 
passive shareholders reduced to the sole function of assuming risk on one side and a board 
with executive decision-making powers on the other, could potentially lead to conflicts of 
interest. The existence of such conflict was later explained by the Agency Theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) which, furthermore, provides the now prevalent 
justification for certain methods of governance by insisting upon their purported ability to 
curtail loss caused by self-interested executive behaviour detrimental to anonymous 
shareholders trading on the stock market. For Berle and Means (1932), the separation of 
ownership and control is a direct result of the empirical evidence that ownership structure is 
increasingly dispersed within ever-larger companies. As a result, this dispersal of ownership 
has deprived shareholders of the necessary power and incentive to exercise effective control 
over executive behaviour. It coincided with the spectacular development of the financial 
market enabling the ownership of large companies to be passed outside of the founding family 
while ensuring continuous professional management (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 1997). The 
dominant model of governance, therefore, appears to be closely linked to the expansion of the 
financial market and a particular manner of holding and exercising ownership rights. 
A large portion of research in the financial field, particularly that related to the Law and 
Finance school of thought (La Porta et al., hereinafter LLSV, 1998, 1999), seeks to explain 
corporate ownership structure according to governance mechanisms designed to protect the 
interests of financial investors. The dominant approach focuses on intentional and 
standardized governance mechanisms, including the law, aimed at protecting all investors, 
especially external ones, who have far less access to information. For Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), “corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment […and] that managers 
do not steal the capital” (p. 737). For LLSV, the existence of governance mechanisms that 
protect numerous and anonymous shareholders is the key to an effective financial market that 
makes the resulting dispersal of capital and the separation of ownership functions viable. 
In the absence of a governance model based on strong legal and regulatory protections for 
shareholders (regardless of their identity) and their interests, the (agency) cost resulting from 
the separation of ownership and control is exorbitant. 
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In countries where legal protection is allegedly weak, such as France, this would explain why 
it is most often the founding members who retain ownership (LLSV). Therefore, a controlling 
shareholder can effectively monitor agency costs in countries where legal protection is weak. 
This would explain a particular type of shareholding (concentrated within the founding 
family) by default. In other words, the majority of companies in a country like France 
maintain this block shareholding for the simple reason that, given the deficient regulatory 
framework, opening up too much capital to a liquid financial market would not be viable. 
Concentrated ownership is thus the imposed choice. However, this explanation poses a certain 
number of problems. Namely, while the number of companies with concentrated ownership is 
relatively high in France (La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002), Berle and Means-
style firms do still exist and have survived for considerable periods of time. Some examples 
would be firms such as Société Générale and Axa (whose CEOs were fervent promoters of the 
dominant Law and Finance notion of governance cf. Wirtz, 2008, 2009). These French firms 
have widely dispersed capital and their shares are traded on the Euronext stock market which, 
we note, now functions much like the New York Stock Exchange. This clearly shows that the 
Berle and Means model can survive in France, where shareholder protection levels are 
nevertheless low according to the LLSV assessment scale. We observe, for example, that in a 
country like the United States, with a high level of protection, the Berle and Means style firm 
is not the only model encountered and furthermore, this model has been in decline for some 
time in favour of increasingly concentrated shareholding (Holderness et al., 1999; Holderness, 
2009). 
This observation leads us to question other explanations concerning the adoption of a certain 
ownership holding pattern and to reverse the causal link between the concept of ownership 
and the governance mechanisms implemented. Thus, the chosen ownership model would 
produce a particular configuration of governance and not the other way around. 
Following the example of the Upper-Echelons Theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), we start 
from the premise that an organization’s values reflect, to a certain extent, the values of its top 
managers, meaning that ownership structure and governance mechanisms potentially depend 
on other factors than the management of conflicts of interest; namely, factors related to the 
top managers’ values. 
Surely then, it would be wise to examine a unique example of governance; one that differs 
greatly from the dominant model, and to study to what extent its configuration is derived from 
a value system unlike that of the dominant model.  The Auchan group is one such example, 
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because despite its significant development and size, its capital has never been opened up 
outside of the Mulliez family circle or Auchan employees. 
Therefore, a study of this special case should make it possible to illustrate the relationship 
between corporate top management values, the notion of ownership and the governance 
model. Auchan is one of France’s largest retail and distribution groups. For fifty years it has 
operated according to a particular corporate governance system. Despite its significant size 
today (according to L’Express on 18/05/06, it is France’s 11th largest firm with a turnover of 
€33.6 billion) it is an unlisted privately-owned enterprise. 85% of the capital is held by the 
Mulliez family through its family association (AFM), which also controls the family’s other 
stores (including Decathlon and St. Maclou).  The family association currently has 
approximately 500 members. Despite its size, it has remained stable over time. It is governed 
by rules inspired by the 1961 social encyclical of Pope John XXIII (Le Nouvel Observateur, 
29 June 2006 edition). The remaining capital is held by the group’s employees through a 
structure called ValAuchan. Very early on, Gérard Mulliez, the group’s founder, implemented 
a share-holding mechanism enabling employees to own part of the tool of their labour, so to 
speak. At the time, he was a pioneer in this matter, well in advance of the legislation on 
employee profit-sharing and shareholding schemes. 
The group chooses to remain unlisted, preferring self-finance and ensuring that the capital 
remains within the family. The supervisory bodies thus enjoy continuity and Auchan does not 
focus its communication on ‘best practices’ of governance, a subject that is becoming 
increasingly institutionalized in French capitalism (cf. Wirtz, 2008 a. and b.). Auchan is 
therefore a case that seems to resist certain types of isomorphic pressure (Aguilera and 
Curevo-Cazurra, 2004) concerning governance practices. From here, we might question the 
specific beliefs that underpin this model of governance and may provide an understanding of 
its particularities. The decision to remain unlisted is a choice, not a necessity. Moreover, the 
group’s top managers practice a value system that is explicitly inspired by the social doctrine 
of the Catholic Church. Therefore, the case study of Auchan, whose governance model is 
unique in the contemporary French economic landscape, seems well-suited to illustrate a 
positive explanation of a private family shareholding structure (as opposed to the default 
explanation offered by LLSV) despite strong growth and successive generations. 
We will show how Auchan’s specific ownership holding structure and associated governance 
mechanisms are part of a reasoned choice and not from the lack of a viable alternative.1 This 
                                                 
1
 Carrefour, another major retail and distribution company (same sector, same national context) also started out 
as a family venture. However, the family took the opposite approach and opened itself to the financial market. 
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choice was strongly encouraged by a value system that borrows, in this particular case, from 
the Catholic social doctrine. This research will highlight the role of the value system of those 
in the upper echelons (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) as a key explanatory variable in the 
implementation and longevity of certain governance mechanisms.2 
The following section of this article is structured as follows. The first part will underline a few 
fundamental concepts related to the issue of corporate governance focusing in particular on 
the concept of ownership that underpins the dominant model today. This model, being 
focused on the protection of anonymous and passive shareholding, provides the basis for 
codes of conduct now largely commonplace within major listed companies in France. In order 
to understand the link between the value system and the governance model in the case of 
Auchan, we must present the corpus doctrinaire from which the group’s founding top 
managers have taken inspiration. Therefore, the second part of the article is dedicated to 
outlining the notion of ownership as described in the Catholic Church’s social doctrine. We 
will see that by placing people and the quality of human relations (rather than the financial 
markets) at its core, the social doctrine leads to an approach to governance which differs from 
the ownership model of the Berle and Means style corporation. 
The third part of this article will be devoted to a detailed analysis of Auchan. In particular, we 
will identify the specific concept of ownership upheld by the group’s founder, highlighting 
the central elements of the Catholic Church’s social doctrine present in its discourse and the 
justification of the governance mechanisms in place. This will enable us to characterize the 
                                                                                                                                                        
The family now holds only a marginal place within the ownership structure, and it certainly wasn’t the 
supposedly weak legal protection offered to stock market investors that prevented the company from going 
public.1 On the contrary, a specific type of ownership was chosen, transferable to third parties via the financial 
market, which had consequences in terms of governance.  
 
2
 Roe (2000), in particular, highlights the role of political ideology in the emergence of this separation-of-
functions ownership model, now characteristic of American capitalism. For Roe liberal political ideology is what 
created the premise for Berle and Means type firms, despite their inherent instability. In this context, the 
governance mechanisms designed to protect financial investors are not the cause, but the consequence of the 
separation-of-functions ownership model, though these two dimensions later had a tendency to mutually support 
and reinforce each other. Wirtz (2002) also identifies ideology as a central vector in the emergence of 
governance systems. However, he points to the concept of mental models, borrowed from North’s institutional 
analysis, which is broader than the political ideology as defined by Roe.  
Roe’s political explanation is based at a macro analytical level, concerning the stylized characteristics of national 
corporate governance mechanisms. Consequently, it is incapable of explaining the variability of governance 
mechanisms between companies located within the same country. Our own analysis is based at a micro 
analytical level, where management team values are analyzed as a decisive factor in a company’s orientation, 
setting it apart from that of its counterparts within the same national context. Therefore, we adopt the central 
premise of the Upper Echelons Theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Carpenter et al., 2003; Hambrick, 2007), 
according to which a company reflects the experience and values of its top managers. 
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specific structure of Auchan’s governance mechanisms and to demonstrate the existence of a 
link with a value system rooted in Catholicism in the North of France. 
 
1. The dominant model of governance and the underlying concept of ownership 
 
1.1. Corporate governance: definitions and mechanisms. 
 
Corporate governance may be defined as “the set of mechanisms that define powers and 
influence decisions of senior executives, in other words the mechanisms that govern their 
behaviour and define their range of discretionary action” (Charreaux, 1997, p. 421-422). This 
definition highlights, among other things, the systemic nature of all governance mechanisms 
(“set of mechanisms”) which, far from being limited to one single supervisory body such as 
the board of directors, includes other regulatory bodies to evaluate managerial behaviour at 
different levels and in various ways. 
Charreaux proposes the following typology (table 1) of governance mechanisms, allowing for 
the fact that the actual combination and interaction of governance mechanisms may differ 
greatly from one firm to another. This general typology will be applied to our case study 
enabling us to present the particularities of Auchan’s governance system in a methodical way. 
We will then show that the specific elements of this table for a given firm depend on that 
firm’s own concept of ownership which itself is not an inevitability; rather it may result from 
the choice of a particular value system. 
 
 
Table 1 – Typology of governance mechanisms according to Charreaux (1997) 
 
 Specific mechanisms Non-specific mechanisms  
Intentional mechanisms  - Direct shareholder 
control (face to face 
interactions) 
- board of directors 
- remuneration 
systems  
- formal structure  
- works council  
- company union  
- legal and regulatory 
environment 
(corporate law, 
labour law …) 
- national unions 
- statutory auditors  
Spontaneous mechanisms  - informal networks of 
trust  
- reciprocal 
- goods and services 
market  
- financial markets 
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monitoring among 
managers 
- enterprise  culture  
- reputation among 
employees (keeps 
promises) 
- financial 
intermediation 
- managerial labour 
market 
- business culture 
- training market 
Source: Charreaux (1997, p. 427) 
 
1.2. Passive ownership and the financial market at the heart of the dominant approach to 
governance. 
 
Agency Theory provides the logic behind the dominant governance approach, (cf. Daily et al., 
2003). It has developed based on a particular model of ownership, that of the big firm said to 
be ‘managerial’ due to the highly dispersed nature of ownership among anonymous and 
scattered shareholders who are unlikely to interfere with the decisions of professional 
managers. In this case, the passive nature of ownership exposes the shareholders to the risk of 
partial expropriation by the CEO. The potential for the management’s interest to conflict with 
the almost powerless anonymous shareholders is the central premise of Agency Theory, 
which sees in it a source of cost (agency costs) which must be managed through governance 
mechanisms to become a source of value creation for the shareholder. The purpose is thus to 
maximize the market value of the shares, independently of the shareholders' particular identity 
and aspirations. 
The dominant model of governance is built upon conceptual foundations that are very much 
inspired by liberalism. Fama and Jensen, the two key contributors to the positive theory of 
agency are of the Chicago school. Charreaux (2003, p. 139) notes that “the liberalism 
defended by Jensen is as much influenced by Austrian economists, such as Hayek, as by his 
time at the University of Chicago. Moreover, in some of his work it is difficult to distinguish 
the share of scientific analysis from the share of ideological positioning.  
Fama, the other main analyst of the consequences on governance of a dispersed and weak 
shareholdership (Fama and Jensen, 1983), is also the key theoretician of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis. For Hamon (2003, p.88), “Fama’s work covers every type of financial decision 
and places the market at the centre of the analysis.” 
 
In his remarkable work on the role of political ideology in the rise of the dominant American 
corporate governance model, Roe (2000) also underlines the importance of the Chicago 
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school’s liberalism. He considers that the view defended by Milton Friedman in his New York 
Times article in 1970, is dominant in business circles today (cf. note 30, p. 554).  
 
From this perspective, the market - the financial market in particular – plays a central role, at 
the top of the hierarchy of governance mechanisms, because of its supposed effectiveness in 
solving agency problems (Jensen, 1991). For the sake of economic efficiency, other 
governance mechanisms, such as legal constraints, should be compatible with the free and 
unhindered operation of a developed financial market (LLSV). Thus the financial market 
becomes a governance mechanism par excellence. Other mechanisms are demoted in this 
liberal ideology where maximizing the market value of the shares (shareholder value) is the 
ultimate goal, regardless of the individual values and aspirations of the persons owning shares 
at any given time. According to this approach, governance is exclusively focused on 
protecting the owners’ financial interests. The primacy of investor protection - while never 
questioning their corporate social responsibility – is made explicit in the very definition of 
corporate governance provided in the summary of the literature considered the mainstream 
reference on the matter: “the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 737). 
 
1.3. The dominant approach and its implications for governance practices  
 
This financial approach to governance, focused solely on maximizing shareholder value and 
using the market as a control mechanism on the condition that it guarantees investor 
protection, has given rise to a series of practical recommendations concerning complementary 
governance mechanisms, including legislation, statutory audits, hostile takeovers and the 
board of directors. These recommendations have received prominent support3 and have been 
extensively promoted as codes of ‘good conduct’ since the second half of the 1990s (Wirtz, 
2008). Serving the financial markets is the ultimate goal, more or less explicitly prescribed by 
a number of governance practices promoted by the dominant model. The OECD Corporate 
Governance Framework stipulates its first principle in the following way: “The corporate 
                                                 
3
 The World Bank, in particular, designed a benchmarking programme for national governance systems as per 
the OECD Corporate Governance Framework. We note that several (former) senior directors of the World Bank, 
such as the economists Lawrence Summers and Simeon Djankow are closely connected, as co-authors and 
friends, to the promoters of the LLSV Law and Finance approach. Andrei Shleifer himself, in his capacity as 
government advisor, contributed directly to the plan to deregulate the Russian financial market. 
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governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets” (OCDE, 2004, p. 
17).  
Concretely speaking, in the standard approach to governance, some mechanisms have been 
studied more than others. Such is the case of the board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983), 
the market for corporate control (Jensen 1986, 1991, 1993), the managerial labour market 
(Fama, 1980), as well as the legal and regulatory environment (LLSV). These mechanisms 
have been the subject of extensive literature and multiple attempts at regulation (various ‘best 
practices’ codes for boards of directors, European and national regulation of financial markets 
and takeovers, legal initiatives aimed at protecting investors). Together they form a kind of 
governance standard, the role and operation of which have been designed according to a 
specific form of holding and exercising corporate ownership rights. It concerns passive 
ownership in a free and unhindered capital market, i.e. the Berle and Means model. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) are very clear about the importance of the configuration of ownership rights 
(separation of the functions of risk assumption and decision making) to justify the role of the 
board of directors as a supervisory body independent of the exucutives’ interests (high 
proportion of external directors). Roe (2000) considers that the Berle and Means (1932) 
ownership model was only able to emerge because the United States’ dominant political 
ideology was so strongly influenced by liberalism at the time. According to Roe (2000), this 
ownership model – extremely fragile due to its propensity for creating agency conflicts –  
survived only because of certain governance mechanisms (e.g. a powerful and well-informed 
board of directors able to avoid the spoliation of anonymous and dispersed shareholders). 
Therefore, the standard set of governance mechanisms were derived with reference to the 
interests of external investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) acting in the financial market. So, 
for Jensen (2000), the main aim of any firm should be to protect the firm’s long term market 
value.4  For Roe (2000), maximizing shareholder value is part of the set of mechanisms that 
limit an executive’s scope in the standard liberal approach to governance.  
For Jensen (2000, p. 16), there is something quasi-religious about this attachment to 
shareholder value, as can be seen in his use of the word ‘nihilistic’ to describe those who 
reject this standard.  
 
Therefore, we might consider that, in addition to an independent board of directors and the 
control exerted by markets, the credo of maximizing shareholder value is part of the set of 
                                                 
4
 ‘long term market value of the firm’ 
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mechanisms that ‘govern the behaviour’ (Charreaux, 1997) of managers in the standard 
model. Previous developments make it possible to sketch a schematic model of governance 
according to the current dominant approach (table 2). 
 
Table 2 – The standard disciplinary model of governance for a Berle and Means style firm. 
 
 Specific mechanisms Non-specific mechanisms  
Intentional mechanisms  
- Independent and 
well-informed Board 
of Directors  
(supervisory role to 
reduce agency costs) 
- Legal and regulatory 
environment (to 
ensure investor 
protection)   
- Governance 
frameworks 
(Cadbury, OECD, 
Bouton etc.) advising 
the board on how 
best to reduce 
managerial agency 
costs) 
Spontaneous mechanisms  
- Reciprocal 
monitoring among 
managers to reduce 
asymmetry of 
information 
 
- goods and services 
market  
- financial market 
- managerial labour 
market 
- maximization of 
shareholder value 
(the long term 
market value is 
presented as the key 
objective of a firm 
which, according to 
Jensen (2000), 
should make it 
possible to 
distinguish good and 
bad decisions). 
 
 
1.4. Review of the values that underpin the dominant approach to governance 
 
We will now compare and contrast the liberal philosophy reflected by the dominant approach 
to governance with the doctrine that inspired Auchan’s founders to understand the 
particularities of this alternative system based on the values of the Catholic Church’s social 
doctrine. 
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The Catholic Church uses an anthropological argument to oppose liberal individualism5 and 
the secularization of society that resulted from the Enlightenment, which the Church holds 
responsible for social dislocation. 
 
Modern Man is defined by his rights, not as a creation of God as in the old Christian 
tradition.6 The consequences of this anthropological rupture are important in determining the 
way in which society is structured. Traditional Christian philosophy defines Man as a political 
animal who must deduce from nature God’s design for him. In other words, he is given – by 
God – a choice to seek salvation. For Christians, spiritual life is certainly valued but this 
question of salvation is also played out in daily life: Man is encouraged to respect the dignity 
of his fellow Man at all times. For that, social order must be subject to Christian morality and 
human actions subject to the law. So Man’s quest for his purpose must serve the common 
good. The liberal thought of the Enlightenment opposes the political influence of Christian 
values on society.7 
 
To the modern mind, Man is the sole creator of his own values, and so it is normal to find a 
variety of opinions in modern society. This primacy of liberty drives political theory to 
structure society in such a way that political authority serves no single value system, so as to 
avoid relationships of subordination between individuals. The law by which modern Man has 
chosen to abide, must be respectful of his rights.8 The English philosopher John Locke is a 
key figure in the history of modern thinking. If the law aims to protect the rights of the 
individual and not to serve selfish interests, the former being the ultimate good (as the 
classical philosophers were wont to say) then should we start with what is fundamentally 
animal about Man i.e. his instinct of self preservation, in order to define political order. Locke 
closely links the legitimacy of private possession to the necessity to eat. To survive, man has a 
right to own the fruits of his own labour.9 Modern man is an owner and a worker 
                                                 
5
 The Church also stigmatizes socialist totalitarianism. We focus only on the study of liberalism in this paper.  
6
 Paragraph 1.4 is a free interpretation of the ideas of Pierre Manent developed in The City of Man, Paris, Fayard, 
1994. 
7
 In the introduction to his An Intellectual History of Liberalism, (Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1987), Pierre Manent 
does not consider the Enlightenment’s war against Christianity as the “expression of an immense 
misunderstanding” rather, he sees the meaning of modernity. 
8
 Pierre Manent summarizes the question well: “Opinion without power, power without opinion” in Les libéraux, 
Paris, Hachette-Pluriel, 1986, volume 1, preface, p. 14-15. 
9
 Locke proposes that hunger is the primary threat to man, to which Pierre Manent responds: « Si l’homme 
fondamental, si je puis dire, c’est l’homme qui a faim, cet homme est radicalement séparé de ses semblables : il 
n’a de relations qu’avec son corps et avec la nature. Si Locke réussit à faire naître les droits de l’individu de la 
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« propriétaire parce que travailleur, travailleur parce que propriétaire.”10 Henceforth society 
becomes economic. Modern liberal philosophy places ownership and the economy at the heart 
of political and social life.11  
Modern power, then, has no other aim than to ensure the inviolability of private ownership 
with a view to guaranteeing the rights of Man and, in particular, his liberty.12 Where Christian 
law aims for moral perfection in Man, modern law becomes an instrument designed to protect 
the rights of the individual, sole creator of his values. The socialization of individuals is no 
longer based on key ideas; rather it is based on protecting their choice, in other words: their 
interests. Adam Smith is quite rightly cited as being the herald of the liberal agenda: “It is not 
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard to their own interest.”13 It is a profound evolution in the course of traditional 
morality. It is tinged with utilitarianism – individual interests prevail – and with materialism. 
The liberal economic system is moral because it efficiently increases the wealth produced and 
therefore distributed. The invisible hand of the competitive market turns individual egos into 
social harmony.  
 
For the Church14 modern individualistic anthropology can only lead to the exaltation of 
personal interest which, unless it reflects the common values defined by the Church - the 
Common Good, in the rhetoric of the Church’s Social Doctrine (CSD) –, becomes a selfish 
interest encouraging rivalry and violence among individuals. When applied to the firm, this 
theory of social decay as a consequence of self-interested behaviour leads the Church to 
deplore the recurring tendency of capitalism to seek the highest profit, to favour capital over 
                                                                                                                                                        
seule faim, du seul rapport de l’individu solitaire à la nature, il aura montré comment les droits peuvent être un 
attribut de l’individu » (Manent, 1987, Histoire intellectuelle du libéralisme, Paris, Calmann-Lévy,  p. 95- 96). 
10
 Pierre Manent, Op.Cit , p. 97. 
11
 « Ce que Locke nous a donné à voir, c’est le développement de la société économique complète à partir de ce 
si chétif commencement : l’individu qui a faim. Toute la vie économique, avec l’échange, la productivité du 
travail, le droit de propriété, prend en quelque sorte la « naturalité » et le caractère incontestable de droit qu’a 
l’individu qui a faim de se nourrir. Dans cet individu qui a faim réside la base substantielle, naturelle, 
primordiale de la vie humaine. On voit pourquoi le programme libéral, une fois qu’il est complètement élaboré, 
fait du droit de propriété, et tend à faire de l’économie en général le fondement de la vie sociale et politique : si 
les règles qui organisent la vie sociale doivent naître du droit de l’individu solitaire, elles ne peuvent trouver leur 
fondement que dans le rapport de cet individu à la nature. », Pierre Manent, La cité de l’homme., p. 102-103. 
12
 Which made Louis Dumont say that private ownership in the modern regime is an attribute of the individual. 
Louis Dumont, Homo-aequalis I, Genèse et épanouissement de l’idéologie économique, Paris, Gallimard, 1985. 
 (Homo-aequalis I, The Genesis and Triumph of  Economic Ideology). 
13
 Adam Smith Enquête sur la nature et les causes de la richesse des nations, Paris, PUF, 1995, livres I-ll, p. 15-
16). (An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations) 
 
14
 The following pragaraph borrows ideas from our work, Bernard Laurent, L’enseignement social de l’Eglise et 
l’économie de marché, Paris, Parole et Silence, 2007. 
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work. While the teachings of the Church throughout the 20th century have acknowledged that 
capitalism has evolved past its original form, described by the CSD as “primitive” (John-Paul 
II, Le-7,1 ; 13,5),  “savage” (Ca-33) and “Manchester Liberalism”  (Qa-60) to stigmatize its 
violence, popes after the Council, at a time when societies in developed nations are less 
inegalitarian, nevertheless warn their contemporaries against greed and seeking profit alone 
which, in their view, is detrimental to justice. In the wake of the liberal revolution, started in 
the 1980s in the US with Reagan and in the UK with Thatcher, before spreading around the 
world, which endorsed the free market and entrepreneurship, with a reduced role for the State, 
John Paul II expressed his concern, in Le and then in Ca, about the development of certain 
capitalist practices which encouraged profit seeking and threatened to bring back the terrible 
social reality of savage capitalism (Le-7,1 and 13,5, Ca-8). Pope Benedict XVI echoes this by 
condemning the domination of shareholders in the management of firms that organise 21st 
century capitalism to their sole advantage and denounces the shareholder value management 
model (Cv-40). Faced with the reality of companies in which the rights of capital dominate 
the rights of labour, to varying degrees depending on the aforementioned developments, the 
Church has always defended a concept of enterprise in which there is a relationship of 
complementarity between work and capital.15 
 
By insisting on this complementarity, the Church attaches the right of ownership – a right it 
fully recognizes – to a social mortgage.   
 
 
 
2. The universal destination of goods as an expression of a different approach to 
ownership and the exercise of related rights: 
 
The founders of Auchan adhere to this Catholic tradition that is markedly different from the 
liberal doctrine. In order to understand certain choices this major retail and distribution group 
has made concerning the shareholding and the organization of governance, we must examine 
more closely the Catholic Social Doctrine and its tenets on ownership. The Catholic Church’s 
values are opposed to a purely technical and materialistic approach to ownership rights. In just 
over a century, the Church has elaborated a large body of doctrines devoted to social and 
                                                 
15
 §277 of the Compendium. 
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economic matters, including the encyclical Caritas in veritate by Pope Benedict XVI, 
published in 2009, which is only the latest update of a long series begun in 1891 by Leo 
XIII.16  
The Church’s Social Doctrine (henceforth ‘CSD’) adamantly defends ownership rights while 
pointedly underlining the related responsibilities (namely the social ones), and by grounding 
its legitimacy in the productive and active role the owner plays in achieving progress in the 
community. The Catholic approach to private ownership differs from the liberal approach that 
underpins the standard model of governance in that (1) both the acquisition and use of 
ownership rights are subjected to a moral code  governed by the respect of people and the 
consideration of the greater good and (2) ownership can only be legitimate if the owner 
actively contributes to the growth of the common good, which cannot be reduced to economic 
growth alone. This notion of ownership as responsible and active, serving human interest in 
all aspects (i.e. not just its economic and financial aspects), affects the way a company 
perceives the role of its governance system and seeks to structure it. In order to better 
understand the challenges for Auchan, we aim to methodically retrace the notion of ownership 
within the CSD. 
 
2.1. The CSD in favour of private ownership   
 
Leo XIII and each of his successors have strongly defended the right to ownership in the face 
of collectivist ideology.17 However, the Church doesn’t make ownership a sacred right as 
liberal ideology does. The Church attaches the right to ownership to a social mortgage with 
the principle of the universal destination of goods.  
 
Faced with the ravages of industrial society, the Pope warns Catholics against socialist 
precepts (Rn- 3 and 4). He clearly states that he is in favour of private ownership (Rn-5) but 
that he relegates its use to the principle of the universal destination of goods and draws from 
the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas: The foundation of this doctrine lies in the distinction 
between the rightful possession of wealth and its legitimate use. “Private ownership, as we 
have seen, is the natural right of man, and to exercise that right, especially as members of 
society, is not only lawful, but absolutely necessary. ‘It is lawful,’ says St. Thomas Aquinas, 
‘for a man to hold private property; and it is also necessary for the carrying on of human 
                                                 
16
 See appendix 1. 
17
 All contributors of the social doctrine are unanimous. 
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existence’ (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, Q. 66, a. 2). But if the question be 
asked: How must one's possessions be used? - the Church replies without hesitation in the 
words of the same holy doctor: "Man should not consider his material possessions as his own, 
but as common to all, so as to share them without hesitation when others are in need. Whence 
the Apostle with, ‘Command the rich of this world... to offer with no stint, to apportion 
largely’ (Thomas Aquinas, II-II, Q. 65, a. 2). (Rn-22)  
 
Along with the two sides of ownership, the individual and the social, the Church has found a 
balanced position from which to target the critics of liberalism and socialism accordingly: 
“Accordingly, twin rocks of shipwreck must be carefully avoided. For, as one is wrecked 
upon, or comes close to, what is known as individualism by denying or minimizing the social 
and public character of the right of property, so by rejecting or minimizing the private and 
individual character of this same right, one inevitably runs into collectivism or at least closely 
approaches its tenets.” (Qa-46)  
 
2.2. Laying the foundations of ownership: trompe l’oeil liberalism 
 
Leo XIII insisted that legitimate ownership is based on labour: “Now, when man thus turns 
the activity of his mind and the strength of his body toward procuring the fruits of nature, by 
such act he makes his own that portion of nature's field which he cultivates - that portion on 
which he leaves, as it were, the impress of his personality; and it cannot but be just that he 
should possess that portion as his very own, and have a right to hold it without any one being 
justified in violating that right. (Rn-9) As Hugues Puel18 points out, Lockean principles are 
evoked here. However, if not to protect the right of ownership, the Pope defends its 
legitimacy not as a strictly individual right beyond the reach of the law, but as a right attached 
to a social mortgage, in other words as a right that is regulated and restricted in its use by law. 
 
 
While Leo XIII underlined the social aspects of ownership and property, Pius XI emphasized 
the importance of the human use of law in the shaping of private ownership and property, 
while being wary of collectivization: “Those, therefore, doing a work that is truly salutary and 
                                                 
18
 Pope Leo XIII’s doctrine on property and ownership « se rapproche de celle du philosophe libéral anglais John 
Locke, qui, le premier déclare la propriété privée comme un droit naturel en la fondant sur le travail, argument 
dont Léon XIII fait grand usage dans Rerum novarum », Hugues Puel, Les paradoxes de l’économie. L’éthique 
au défi, Paris, Bayard-Centurion, 1995, p. 211-212. 
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worthy of all praise who, while preserving harmony among themselves and the integrity of the 
traditional teaching of the Church, seek to define the inner nature of these duties and their 
limits whereby either the right of property itself or its use, that is, the exercise of ownership, is 
circumscribed by the necessities of social living. On the other hand, those who seek to restrict 
the individual character of ownership to such a degree that in fact they destroy it are mistaken 
and in error.” (Qa- 48) So private ownership, including that of the means of production,19 are 
legitimate, but ownership rights come with a social duty.  
Beyond the justification of ownership through hard work, individuals are driven by need; the 
Church insists on the benefits of fruitful labour: “For the soil which is tilled and cultivated 
with toil and skill utterly changes its condition; it was wild before, now it is fruitful; was 
barren, but now brings forth in abundance. (Rn-10) As well as the conditions under which 
freedom is exercised, the Church emphasizes the social benefits of private appropriation that 
the Church underlines. For Leo XIII as for Pius XI ownership is such an effective gauge of 
efficiency that endangering it would lead to “upset and disturbance […] ; the sources of 
wealth themselves would run dry, for no one would have any interest in exerting his talents or 
his industry.” (Rn-15)  
The Church’s social teachings have always reflected positively on enterprise for the sake of 
general prosperity – “Now a State chiefly prospers and thrives through moral rule, […] 
respect for religion and justice, the moderation and fair imposing of public taxes, the progress 
of the arts and of trade” (Rn – 32)  – Pius XI defends the same virtues, even lucrative ones: 
“Nor is it to be thought that gainful occupations are thereby belittled or judged less consonant 
with human dignity; on the contrary, we are taught to recognize in them with reverence the 
manifest will of the Divine Creator Who placed man upon the earth to work it and use it in a 
multitude of ways for his needs. Those who are engaged in producing goods, therefore, are 
not forbidden to increase their fortune in a just and lawful manner; for it is only fair that he 
who renders service to the community and makes it richer should also, through the increased 
wealth of the community, be made richer himself according to his position, provided that all 
these things be sought with due respect for the laws of God and without impairing the rights 
of others and that they be employed in accordance with faith and right reason. If these 
principles are observed by everyone, everywhere, and always, not only the production and 
acquisition of goods but also the use of wealth, which now is seen to be so often contrary to 
right order, will be brought back soon within the bounds of equity and just distribution. The 
                                                 
19
 This is specified in Mater et magistra, §-19 then in §-113. Former encyclicals approve without ever explicity 
mentioning the rights of capital. 
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sordid love of wealth, which is the shame and great sin of our age, will be opposed in actual 
fact by the gentle yet effective law of Christian moderation…” (Qa-136).  
This benevolent attitude towards private enterprise is often ignored, while it is true that the 
recognition of its positive role is closely monitored. Leo XIII and Pius XI’s successors have 
maintained this favourable attitude towards private firms so long as they operate with a social 
objective. Pope John XXIII, the Pope of the Second Vatican Council, summed up the 
Church’s position while defending the right to take financial initiative (Mm 51 and 57) and 
takes a positive stance towards industrial activity. 
2.3. Concrete requirements of SDC regarding corporate governance 
 
Property law is therefore recognised, but burdened with a social mortgage. Its use is 
subordinated to the service of justice and the common good, as if owners were, in a sense, 
only depositories. We note three obligations that are tirelessly set out in the various social 
encyclicals as a concrete application of the duties incumbent on owners of the means of 
production: the just wage, employee participation, and temperance in acquisition and the use 
of property. 
 
The just wage   
The Church defends a moral approach to wages that reflects the complementary inputs of 
each factor of production: “It is entirely false to ascribe to the property alone or to the work 
alone whatever has been obtained through the combined effort of both, and it is wholly unjust 
for either, denying the efficacy of the other, to arrogate to itself whatever has been produced.” 
(Qa-59)20 To ensure harmony, Leo XIII reminded each party of its duties, principally those 
arising from justice (Rn-16); foremost of these is the duty for the worker “fully and faithfully 
to perform the work which has been freely and equitably agreed upon” (Rn-16) while 
refraining from giving in to “men of evil principles” who “work upon them”, only making 
artful “promises” or even inciting him to defend his own cause with “violence” or engage in 
“riot and disorder” (Rn-16). For their part, employers must not subject workers to “slavery” 
(Rn-16), which leads to the problem of the “just wage” as a duty of justice of the “employer” 
(Rn-17). Pius XI carried on Leo XIII’s idea of the “just wage”, which should allow a family to 
live satisfactorily, that is to say, to afford accommodation, food, healthcare, and its children’s 
                                                 
20
 Pius XI carried on with the idea of complementarity expressed before him by Leo XIII: “Just as the symmetry 
of the human frame is the result of the suitable arrangement of the different parts of the body, so in a State is it 
ordained by nature that these two classes should dwell in harmony and agreement, so as to maintain the balance 
of the body politic.” (Rn-15) 
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education.21 He explicitly opposed the liberal concept that wages are a price freely negotiated 
on a market, like any other good.22 The conciliar popes perpetuated for their contemporaries 
the idea of the just wage, which should be funded by combined social policies.23 
 
Participation  
The Church defines business as a primarily human, then economic institution. John XXIII 
centred the Church’s teaching on human dignity, which led him to describe business as a 
“human community” (Mm-91).24 The Vatican Council encyclicals thus set out the theme of 
human dignity for companies’ attention. 
This concept of business as a place for the complementary talents of capital and labour led to 
participation. The idea had already been advanced by Pius XI, who mentioned it relative to 
management and profit-sharing: “Wage-earners and other employees participate in the 
ownership or the management or in some way share in the profits”  (Qa-72). This theme was 
amplified by the conciliar popes: first John XXIII, who devoted several articles to it in Mm, 
then each of his successors. The “good pope” defined employee participation in ownership of 
the business as a means to promote greater justice.25 He referred to Pius XI when stating that 
                                                 
21
 John XXIII’s definition perfectly summarises the position of both popes: “Workers must be paid a wage which 
allows them to live a truly human life and to fulfil their family obligations in a worthy manner.” (Mm-71).  
22
 Leo XIII set moral law against the freedom to negotiate a paid contract on a free market: “Let the working man 
and the employer make free agreements, and in particular let them agree freely as to the wages; nevertheless, 
there underlies a dictate of natural justice more imperious and ancient than any bargain between man and man, 
namely, that wages ought not to be insufficient to support a frugal and well-behaved wage-earner.” (Rn-34). John 
XXIII questioned whether the wage should be set by the marketplace: “We therefore consider it Our duty to 
reaffirm that the remuneration of work is not something that can be left to the laws of the marketplace; nor 
should it be a decision left to the will of the more powerful. It must be determined in accordance with justice and 
equity” (Mm-71).  
23
 For example: Mm-33, Gs-67-2, Le-19. As the Western countries and Japan developed, social teaching focused 
more on the reality of the just wage in developing countries (John Paul II in Ca-34), even though he stressed 
that, in the developed countries, regression was still possible (Ca-8 et Ca-34). Benedict XVI held similar views 
(Cv-63). 
24
 John Paul II, who was deeply influenced by personalist ideas, spoke of a “community of persons” (Ca-35) or a 
“society of persons”: “For such a task, the Church offers her social teaching as an indispensable and ideal 
orientation, a teaching which, as already mentioned, recognizes the positive value of the market and of 
enterprise, but which at the same time points out that these need to be oriented towards the common good. This 
teaching also recognizes the legitimacy of workers’ efforts to obtain full respect for their dignity and to gain 
broader areas of participation in the life of industrial enterprises so that while cooperating with others and under 
the direction of others, they can in a certain sense ‘work for themselves’ through the exercise of their intelligence 
and freedom. The integral development of the human person through work does not impede but rather promotes 
the greater productivity and efficiency of work itself, even though it may weaken consolidated power structures. 
A business cannot be considered only as a ‘society of capital goods’; it is also a ‘society of persons’ in which 
people participate in different ways and with specific responsibilities, whether they supply the necessary capital 
for the company’s activities or take part in such activities through their labour.” (Ca-43). 
25
 “Experience suggests many ways in which the demands of justice can be satisfied. Not to mention other ways, 
it is especially desirable today that workers gradually come to share in the ownership of their company, by ways 
and in the manner that seem most suitable. For today, even more than in the time of Our Predecessor [Pius XI], 
‘every effort must be made that at least in future a just share only of the fruits of production be permitted to 
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no party could claim all the rewards of production (Mm-76 quoting from Qa-59). However, 
participation should not be reduced solely to its economic dimension through profit-sharing. It 
should concern labour itself, thanks to each party’s collaboration in the overall operation of 
the business,26 in training (Mm-94), and in supporting internal promotion (Mm-93). John 
XXIII saw participation as the means to tangibly transform a business into a “human 
community”.27 The conciliar constitution, for its part, reiterated “promoting the active 
participation of all in the running of companies”, in line with conditions to be determined as 
best possible (Gs-68), while John Paul II restated the Church’s proposals to foster “joint 
ownership of the means of work, sharing by the workers in the management and/or profits of 
businesses, so-called shareholding by labour, etc.” (Le-14 then Ca-16). 
 
Temperance  
Social doctrine fears that modern society sacrifices people in the headlong search for material 
and pecuniary benefits alone. The conciliar popes amplified their predecessors’ criticisms of 
modern society, which was dominated by the economy. They updated the condemnation of 
chrematistics28 and conspicuous consumption29 by stigmatising contemporary materialism. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
accumulate in the hands of the wealthy, and that an ample sufficiency be supplied to the workers’.” (Mm-77 
citant Qa-68) 
He even proposed that employees, in view of the financial techniques of the early ‘60s, when self-financing was 
a common practice, should have a personal entitlement to the business: “We must notice in this connection [the 
prosperity of a people being measured more by the distribution of the goods and wealth created than by their 
growth – AN] the system of self-financing adopted in many countries by large, or comparatively large firms. 
Because these companies are financing replacement and plant expansions out of their own profits, they grow at a 
very rapid rate. In such cases, we believe that the workers should be allocated shares in the firms for which they 
work, especially when they are paid no more than a minimum wage.” (Mm-75). 
26
 “ (...) all parties [owners, managers and workers] [must] cooperate actively and loyally in the common 
enterprise, not so much for what they can get out of it for themselves, but as discharging a duty and rendering a 
service to their fellow men. All this implies that the workers have their say in, and make their own contribution 
to, the efficient running and development of their enterprise.” (Mm-92)  
27
 “We, no less than Our predecessors, are convinced that employees are justified in wishing to participate in the 
activity of the industrial concern for which they work. It is not, of course, possible to lay down hard and fast 
rules regarding the manner of such participation, for this must depend on prevailing conditions, which vary from 
firm to firm (…). But We have no doubt as to the need for giving workers an active part in the business of the 
company for which they work – be it a private or a public one. Every effort must be made to ensure that the 
enterprise is indeed a true human community, concerned about the needs, the activities and the standing of each 
of its members.” (Mm-91).  
28
 Pius XI is clear on this subject: “The root and font of this defection in economic and social life from the 
Christian law, and of the consequent apostasy of great numbers of workers from the Catholic faith, are the 
disordered passions of the soul, the sad result of original sin which has so destroyed the wonderful harmony of 
man’s faculties that, easily led astray by his evil desires, he is strongly incited to prefer the passing goods of this 
world to the lasting goods of Heaven. Hence arises that unquenchable thirst for riches and temporal goods, which 
has at all times impelled men to break God’s laws and trample upon the rights of their neighbours, but which, on 
account of the present system of economic life, is laying far more numerous snares for human frailty. Since the 
instability of economic life, and especially of its structure, exacts of those engaged in it most intense and 
unceasing effort, some have become so hardened to the stings of conscience as to hold that they are allowed, in 
any manner whatsoever, to increase their profits and use means, fair or foul, to protect their hard-won wealth 
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conciliar constitution draws a distinction between “having” and “being”, by pointing out that 
“man is worth more for what he is than for what he has” (Gs-35). Paul VI, John Paul II and 
Benedict XVI expressed the same concern.30 
 The Church shows itself to be prescriptive, calling on men and women to display a temperate 
attitude to acquisition (profit is not the only purpose of business, and speculation is not 
virtuous) and the use of property.31 A sense of moderation in consumption, instead of 
ostentation, thus makes it possible to serve justice and exercise solidarity towards the most 
deprived,32 a theme that Benedict XVI has defended vigorously by calling for new lifestyles 
“in which the search for truth, beauty, goodness (...) are the factors which determine consumer 
choices, savings and investment”33.  
    
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
against sudden changes of fortune. The easy gains that a market unrestricted by any law opens to everybody 
attract large numbers to buying and selling goods, and they, their one aim being to make quick profits with the 
least expenditure of work, raise or lower prices by their uncontrolled business dealings so rapidly according to 
their own caprice and greed that they nullify the wisest forecasts of producers.” (Qa-143).  
29
 “For since the seeds of a new form of economy were bursting forth just when the principles of rationalism had 
been implanted and rooted in many minds, there quickly developed a body of economic teaching far removed 
from the true moral law, and, as a result, completely free rein was given to human passions. Thus it came to pass 
that many, much more than ever before, were solely concerned with increasing their wealth by any means 
whatsoever, and that in seeking their own selfish interests before everything else they had no conscience about 
committing even the gravest of crimes against others. Those first entering upon this broad way that leads to 
destruction easily found numerous imitators of their iniquity by the example of their manifest success, by their 
insolent display of wealth, by their ridiculing the conscience of others, who, as they said, were troubled by silly 
scruples, or lastly by crushing more conscientious competitors.” (Qa-145).  
30
 Paul VI  (Oa-9); John Paul II (Srs-28); Benedict XVI (Cv-11). 
31
 Concerning “those whom fortune favors”, “a most strict account must be given to the Supreme Judge for all we 
possess” (Rn-18), hence the encouragement to adopt ascetic behaviour: “Christian morality, when adequately 
and completely practiced, leads of itself to temporal prosperity (…); it powerfully restrains the greed of 
possession and the thirst for pleasure [a reference to Timothy 6:10: “For the love of money is the root of all 
evil”] – twin plagues, which too often make a man who is void of self-restraint miserable in the midst of 
abundance; it makes men supply for the lack of means through economy, teaching them to be content with frugal 
living, and further, keeping them out of the reach of those vices which devour not small incomes merely, but 
large fortunes, and dissipate many a goodly inheritance.” (Rn-23).  
32
 “Furthermore, a person’s superfluous income, that is, income which he does not need to sustain life fittingly 
and with dignity, is not left wholly to his own free determination. (...) the rich are bound by a very grave precept 
to practice almsgiving, beneficence, and munificence.” (Qa-55) and “Those who are engaged in producing 
goods, therefore, are not forbidden to increase their fortune in a just and lawful manner; for it is only fair that he 
who renders service to the community and makes it richer should also, through the increased wealth of the 
community, be made richer himself according to his position, provided that all these things be sought with due 
respect for the laws of God and without impairing the rights of others and that they be employed in accordance 
with faith and right reason. If these principles are observed by everyone, everywhere, and always, not only the 
production and acquisition of goods but also the use of wealth, which now is seen to be so often contrary to right 
order, will be brought back soon within the bounds of equity and just distribution.” (Qa-147).  
33
  Cv-51 quoting Ca-36. 
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3. The case of Auchan: Catholic thought, family governance and employee 
participation  
 
We will now explore further the concrete link between the Catholic value base, the ownership 
structure and the governance system in the case under study. Auchan is one of France’s 
largest companies, but deliberately stays out of the stock market; a very high proportion of its 
capital is held by the family of the founder, Gérard Mulliez. Despite its great size, the group 
differs radically from the managerial company described by Berle and Means, for which the 
standard governance model was devised; this aimed primarily to guarantee the financial 
interests of stock-market investors. The purpose of this section is to show that the high 
concentration of ownership within the family, and the company’s unlisted status, stem from 
the founder-chief’s deliberate decision, and that this decision is based on his value system, 
which is strongly influenced by the Church’s social doctrine, which promotes ownership for 
all (employees included) but also the subordination of ownership to one’s social role and 
responsibility. 
To this end, we conducted a semi-directive, centred interview lasting about three hours with 
Gérard Mulliez, which was recorded and transcribed. The idea was to identify, in his 
discourse, the presence and importance of the values of the social doctrine of the Church, as 
well as the consequences of these values in how the company’s oversight system was 
structured. Our research protocol was therefore designed to supply a concrete illustration34 of 
the central premise of Hambrick and Mason’s Upper Echelons Theory (1984), which states 
that a company’s strategic decisions (including those regarding its main governance 
mechanisms) reflect its executives’ values and cognitive structures. In the case of Auchan, we 
consequently intend to first set out the values of its upper echelons (3.1) so as to then show 
how they are reflected in the other governance mechanisms (3.2). To do this, we analysed the 
content of the transcription according to a typological grid of the governance mechanisms 
proposed by Charreaux (1997), cited supra (table 1). We attempted to define each section of 
text that referred to a governance mechanism, according to its more or less specific nature, on 
the one hand; and to its intentional or spontaneous nature, on the other hand. These findings 
are summarised in table 3, which characterises the specific features of Auchan’s governance. 
 
 
                                                 
34
 In epistemological terms, the status and utility of studying an original case as an illustration of a piece of 
conceptual work are discussed by Siggelkov (2007). 
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3.1. The roots of Gérard Mulliez’s thought in the SDC value system 
The governance system, as it appears today, results from a long development strongly 
influenced by the Catholic roots and the personal experiences of the family’s members, in 
their interactions both with each other and with their socio-economic environment. Gérard 
Mulliez highlights this Catholic culture35 as an important legacy, which reaches into his 
business practice: “I feel that we’re steeped in a Catholic culture, whether we like it or not.” 
(Interview with GM, 16/10/08, pages 68-69). His forebears – direct relatives, uncles and aunts 
– are not satisfied with simply professing their faith. For them, it must permeate their 
managerial practices. Gérard Mulliez stresses the role of priests and of Catholic action 
movements that work with business managers – the CFPC (Centre Français du Patronat 
Chrétien, “French Centre for Christian Employers”), which became the EDC (Entrepreneurs 
et Dirigeants Chrétiens, “Christian Entrepreneurs and Managers”) and MCC  (Mouvement 
Chrétien des Cadres et Dirigeants, “Movement of Christian Managers and Corporate 
Officers”): “we studied the encyclicals when we were young, but very intensely”. (GM 
interview, 16/10/08, pg. 68-69).  
 
A brief reminder of the ideological and historical context is required to understand the 
importance of this commitment by the family’s members. Gérard Mulliez is heir to a business 
tradition dating back to the late 19th century, which developed in the 20th century until he 
reoriented it into the mass-retail sector. The family had been deeply affected by industrial and 
ideological conflicts, especially in an industrial region of France with powerful Communist 
and Socialist forces. Although the social situation of the working class had improved 
throughout the post-Second World War growth era, ideological rifts remained, and in France 
in particular, where the Socialist and Communist parties were still advocating a breakaway 
from capitalism; and, in the case of large companies, opposed the private appropriation of the 
means of production. In a context of Cold War ideological confrontation being played out 
across a sensitive industrial region – which today’s young generation have never known – 
debate about the legitimacy of ownership took on a special importance.  
Faced with the Socialists’ and Communists’ threatening stance on the legitimacy of private 
appropriation of the means of production, the Church, in its teachings, forcefully asserted the 
right to property in the name of efficiency; but in no way made it an intangible principle.  
                                                 
35
 Geert Demuijnck stresses its importance within Auchan in his article From an Implicit Christian Corporate 
Culture to a Structured Conception of Corporate Ethical Responsability in a Retail Company: A Case-Study in 
Hermeneutic Ethics, in Journal of Business Ethics, 2009, 84: 387-404, pg. 391. 
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This conception of property defended in the SDC is central, and is widely reflected in the 
discourse of Auchan’s founder. In particular, it contains the idea of the universal destination 
of goods: property is legitimate only on condition that it is used in an active, fruitful and 
generous way. In other words, the shareholder is only its depository – “I think the companies 
don’t belong to us. They used to belong to those who looked after them, and today they still 
belong to those who look after them. And if they don’t look after them well, there’ll be 
nothing left. If they do look after them well, then there will be something left. But we’re not 
really the owners, we know that.” (GM, pg. 71) – and its positive effects must benefit the 
greatest number. He justifies employees sharing in the company’s profits as a concrete 
application of the SDC: “And so, in the encyclicals, when we were told that ‘private property 
should be spread wider’ and that’s what had to be done, my uncles didn’t want me to 
introduce employee share ownership, so I reminded them of the encyclical. I said ‘Listen, it’s 
pointless telling me the encyclicals must be applied, and then refusing when I actually ask you 
to do it’” (GM interview, 16/10/08, pg. 68-69). In fact, Auchan would introduce a bold policy 
(see below): the family’s authorisation went beyond its reservations, which Gérard Mulliez 
understood and attributed to the class-struggle context specific to France: “I understood my 
uncles’ reaction. They had had the Great War and World War II, the strikes in ‘36, and the 
strikes in ‘45 or ‘46. When you’ve nearly gone bankrupt several times, and you’re facing 
tough-nut unionists who never listen, like the CGT at a given time. […] the relatives didn’t 
want to find themselves around the board of directors’ table with people who were impossible 
to manage. So I understood why they were afraid. They were afraid and they said: ‘OK, you 
can do it, but on condition that … before becoming shareholders, every person should attend a 
course on business economics.’ And with the Catholic University’s help, we set up a business 
economics course, which to begin with was actually eighteen hours long.” (GM, pg. 69). 
 
The comments of Gérard Mulliez very closely echo the conception of social doctrine in which 
private appropriation is recognised providing that the owner accepts his duties, in other words 
he deems legitimate the social mortgage incumbent on him: “God intended the earth and all 
its contents for the use of all men and all peoples, so that the benefits of the creation should 
flow fairly into the hand of all, in accordance with the rule of justice, which is inseparable 
from charity. (…). That is why man, in the way he uses it, must never consider his legitimate 
possessions as belonging solely to him, but must view them as common, in the sense that they 
may be profitable not only to him but also to the others” (Gs-69.1). 
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3.2. Impact of corporate-governance mechanisms 
 
In the previous section, we observed that Auchan’s founder subscribed to an approach to 
property that was deeply rooted in the Church’s social doctrine. In addition we observed that 
this value system directly influenced a significant decision regarding the capital structure, 
involving employees in ownership, but also to the responsibilities arising therefrom, for the 
company’s sound management and its development. Other distinctive features characterise 
Auchan’s governance: these are summarised in table 3, based on the general typology of 
governance mechanisms proposed by Charreaux (1997). Each listed mechanism will then be 
illustrated by Gérard Mulliez quotations, with a brief commentary. 
 
Table 3 – Specificities of the Auchan Group’s governance system 
 Specific mechanisms Non-specific mechanisms 
Intentional mechanisms - Wills 
- Internal rules of the 
Mulliez family’s 
association (AFM) 
- employee share 
ownership and 
participation in 
company’s 
management: 
Valauchan 
- supervisory board: 
family, 
Valauchan represent
ative; coaching  
- remuneration 
systems: search for 
moderation 
- Social doctrine of the 
Church (social 
encyclicals, etc.) 
- Christian networks 
(CFPC, MCC): 
“discussions with a 
certain ethical 
perspective”  
Spontaneous mechanisms - internal family share 
market: once a year; 
shareholder-base 
stability 
- internal capital 
market: self-
financing, solidarity, 
long-term 
perspective 
(commitment) 
- family culture: 
Catholicism, 
solidarity, unity, 
entrepreneurship 
 
- business culture: 
paternalist, social-
Catholic tradition of 
Northern France 
- market of goods and 
services: discount 
price and product 
availability  
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3.2.1. Intentional and non-specific mechanisms: SDC “codes” and official relays  
 
Social encyclicals 
Regarding intentional and non-specific mechanisms that influence the behaviour of Auchan’s 
top managers, we should mention the social encyclicals, which are subject to serious analysis 
at family meetings: “The family’s thinking, underpinned by reading and analysing the papal 
encyclicals and their comments on labour, property and business, gradually make it possible 
to formalise the company’s core values and its ethics. Self-respect, respect for others and for 
work, trust, a spirit of service, empowerment, transparency, and a concern for thrift and 
proper management of assets, make this model strangely similar to that of Rhineland 
capitalism”36 (Réale and Dufour, 2005, pg. 259-260). The explicit reference to the Church’s 
teaching during the period when the governance system was designed is confirmed by Gérard 
Mulliez: “we studied the encyclicals when we were young, but very intensely” (GM 
interview, 16/10/08, pg. 68-69).  This shows that the social encyclicals, which contain a 
number of principles and recommendations for companies, some of which directly involve 
governance issues, played a role in framing the behaviour of Auchan’s upper echelons, at 
least during the key period when the group’s identity was forged, a role comparable to that of 
the codes of conduct or codes of governance in some of today’s big listed corporations.  
 
Christian networks 
Gérard Mulliez also frequented Christian employer networks, which enabled him to have 
“discussions with a certain ethical perspective”: 
“At my CFPC or MCC meeting, we talk about each other’s problems, we discuss things. Our 
discussions are based on documents, and then we try to say ‘We agree, we don’t agree’, ‘They 
don’t have their feet on their ground, it’s completely daft’. Or, on the contrary, ‘Yes, maybe 
we could apply this’. Let’s say that, at all times, we hold discussions with a certain ethical 
perspective.” (GM, pg. 11) 
                                                 
36
 Gomez and Wirtz (2008) highlight the very strong influence of the Catholic Church and its social doctrine on 
West Germany’s recovering capitalism after the war. See also Langner (1980). It is noteworthy that the main 
author of Peope Pius XI’s Quadragesimo anno encyclical was the German Jesuit Oswald von Nell-Breuning, 
who also played a significant role in the fledgling Federal Republic of Germany. 
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The CFPC is the Centre Français du Patronat Chrétien (“French Centre for Christian 
Employers”). Founded in 1948, it changed names in 2000 and became Entrepreneurs et 
Dirigeants Chrétiens (“Christian Entrepreneurs and Top Managers”) (EDC). According to its 
official website, the movement strove from the outset “in favour of thought and action that 
were more oriented towards implementation of the Church’s teaching”. The MCC is the 
Mouvement Chrétien des Cadres et dirigeants (“Movement of Christian Executives and Top 
Managers”), affiliated to the French Catholic Church. Its charter states: “The Movement’s 
mission is to help its members act more in keeping with the Spirit of Christ in all places where 
they exercise their responsibilities, and everywhere where they prepare and take their 
decisions. It pays special attention to situations and responsibilities relating to working life, in 
particular those of the executives and top managers of the business world, as well as to the 
French, European and global environments in which they operate”. These Christian networks 
are very structured, and may therefore be viewed as intentional platforms for conveying 
Catholic thought to the top-management community. As a governance mechanism, they can 
therefore be deemed intentional and non-specific. 
 
3.2.2. Spontaneous and non-specific mechanisms: regional culture and business imperatives  
 
Regional business culture 
The regional business culture is one of the spontaneous, non-specific governance 
mechanisms. It has had a susbtantial impact on the mindsets of the Mulliez family members 
and of the top managers from the family: “The regional context was important. By which I 
mean that, in the regional context for example, all the boys were entitled to join the company. 
That’s how it was, the grandfather would say: ‘All my children are equal and they are all 
entitled to join’. They weren’t asked if they were happy to join, they were told: ‘You have to 
join’. And they were also told: ‘Your wage will depend on how many children you have, 
because it depends on how much money you need to live on. Your house was paid for, your 
house was built for you, but it also depended on the number of children you had’. And so 
everything was organised in a patriarchal way, depending on how many children you had.” 
(GM, pg. 8) 
 
Market of goods and services  
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The market of goods and services is certainly a governance mechanism (Fama, 1980; 
Charreaux, 1997), insofar as it imposes limits on top managers’ strategic action. It is clearly 
recognised as such, and governs strategic conduct at Auchan: 
“The customer is king. If the customer isn’t satisfied, the company ceases to exist. So the first 
thing that must be done in a company … because a good company … my first reply is: ‘A 
good company is a company that exists’. And a company can only continue to exist if it 
makes money.” (GM, pg. 11). 
This mechanism clearly applies to any company (it is non-specific), whatever its value 
system. In Gérard Mulliez’s conception, it represents the company’s “physical foot” next to 
its “spiritual foot”. In his view, the company needs both to move forward and develop. 
Indeed, this reflects the idea that governance mechanisms are perceived not just as constraints 
but also as development levers.  
 
3.2.3. Spontaneous and specific mechanisms: family solidarity and internal capital market  
 
Family culture 
Originally, the Mulliez family culture was strongly steeped in Catholicism, and this culture 
does not stop at the company’s door. However, Gérard Mulliez implicitly recognises that a 
certain detachment from this culture has developed over time: 
“My father and his brother Louis were part of the Catholic action network with priests, Jesuits 
and others who were quite remarkable. Father Ranson also made a big impression on them. 
And so they really worked hard. It was better than today’s CFPC. Spirituality… The chaplain 
went into the details of how companies were organised.” (GM, pg. 11). 
Beside the strong involvement of Gérard Mulliez and his parents in Catholic circles, a major 
trait of the family culture is its sense of responsibility vis-à-vis committed people. This sense 
of responsibility was passed on by the parents, who felt it required a real closeness to the 
companies, ownership of which should mean more than a mere financial interest: “So our 
parents wanted us to stay close to the companies, they wanted us to stay close to the 
companies and for the private ownership of the means of production to be something that is 
not… it’s not about money, it’s a question of responsibility. We are responsible. When we 
open a factory, we are responsible for the people we recruit, we are responsible for helping 
them grow, we are responsible… If we want to change things, we need to be responsible, not 
shareholders.” (GM, pg. 7)  
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This sense of responsibility is coupled with a very strong solidarity between the family’s 
members, giving rise to the maxim of “tous dans tout” (“everyone in everything”): 
“The internal rules begin, ‘We stay together because it is better to do business all together 
than separately. It is more efficient and more intelligent to do business all together than 
separately’. So that’s the fundamental reason why they’ve stayed together.” (GM, pg. 6)  
 
Family capital market and internal funding: the rejection of stock-market logic 
The family culture of responsibility and solidarity has an offshoot in one of the most 
distinctive features of Auchan’s governance model, namely the organisation of its internal 
family capital market, where transactions are conducted once a year only by the 500 or so 
family shareholders, according to a strictly controlled process. Becoming a shareholder pre-
supposes obtaining approval from the AFM (the family association) and signing up to the 
AFM charter. As for the company’s development finance, building up cash reserves has 
always been preferred to external fundraising. The family capital market and internal 
development funding are based explicitly on the rejection of the stock-market logic of 
resource allocation, in order to favour relationship-based mechanisms based on a good 
understanding of business and on the people subscribing to the values that shape the 
distinctive features of the governance system. 
 
Internal family share market 
Gérard Mulliez explicitly compares the stock market and the family share market as 
alternative governance mechanisms: “at a given moment, Marcel Fournier [the founding 
family of retail group Carrefour], said to himself: ‘I’d like to give my brothers and sisters a bit 
of money, so I’ll list the company on the stock market’. And he did. Now look what’s left. 
Furthermore, children have worse manners when you’re listed. We are only allowed to sell 
once a year. When you’re only entitled to sell once a year, you spend a year thinking about it. 
Then when you’ve sold, you can’t buy for a year, so if you’ve sold too many, your money 
isn’t well invested between the two points, and you’ve lost something. So reflecting every 
year, and then a year later, rather than every week, makes a company’s true value easier to 
calculate.” (GM, pg. 62) Gérard Mulliez thus rejects the stock market as a governance 
mechanism, so as to guarantee the interests of his own company’s shareholders. His stance 
reflects the conviction that there is a risk of a certain loss of responsibility among the 
shareholders (here, “ill mannered” reflects a loss of values) through an emphasis solely on 
financial interests, which can easily be sold on the stock market. Such a stance implicitly 
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reflects the conviction, borrowed from Catholic thought, that property – besides its financial 
entitlements, which can be immediately converted into cash if necessary – also carries a heavy 
responsibility, which demands that any decision about a possible divestment be taken with 
discernment and after a minimum of reflection. Auchan’s founder thus contrasts the virtues of 
organising an internal capital market like the Mulliez family’s, and its long-term view, with 
the stock market, which is perceived as causing the bond of personal responsibility between 
shareholder and company to break. He is convinced that, over the long term, such an approach 
is in no way at odds with the interests of the family shareholders: 
“I think that the family’s shareholders are far wealthier today, generally speaking, than the 
shareholders of the Halley family, than the shareholders of the Carrefour family, than the 
shareholders of the Castorama family, etc., which are listed companies. So I think the 
shareholders have now understoond that it was a considerable growth and efficiency driver, 
and a considerable justice driver. […] The top managers think: ‘[…], it’s my dough and my 
mates’ dough, so let’s be careful with it’. They’re not like some finance directors who say: 
‘I’m going to boost the share price and cash in, then I’ll go somewhere else where I’ll keep 
my shares, and then I’ll engineer a drop in the share price, then I’ll buy, etc.’. There are 
finance directors who have made a fortune simply by gambling with no regard for their 
company’s interests. So I think it’s a good system. It’s a much better system than the stock 
market, and in any case, the stock market doesn’t let you link the staff to the year’s results and 
share price.” (GM, pg. 63) Here too, the idea of the owner being responsible for the entire 
company is strongly present. 
 
Internal capital market  
To fund the development of its business activities, the Mulliez family favours self-financing 
and adopts a long-term vision: “It’s fundamentally important to leave the money in the 
company. If the Mulliez family withdrew lots of money every year, it would stop the 
company growing at a good rate, and [would compromise] the company’s future value.” (GM, 
pg. 63) 
Indeed, revenues from mature activities allow the start-up of new businesses, unsubjected to 
the short-termist pressures of the financial markets. Besides the solidarity between the 
family’s members, the workings of this internal capital market reflect a strong attachment to 
long-term development, sometimes to the detriment of short-term financial profitability. The 
clearly-stated end goal of financial decisions is therefore not short-term profit but long-term 
development: 
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“The Mulliez family’s smart idea is that, as we’re all shareholders in all the businesses in the 
same proportions […] as we are all shareholders in the same proportions, when we trial a new 
business somewhere, even if it takes seven to ten years to get it going… we bear the start-up 
losses, we put up with the time it takes to train people, we put up with the time it takes to 
adapt to a new reality we didn’t know about, etc. [N.B. there is an implicit notion here of 
“sustainable” finance, which allows support for a learning process necessary for development] 
When you’re by yourself […], decisions about whether to keep going in periods of crisis or 
difficulty […] are harder to take. […] So there are survival opportunities that arise when 
you’re by yourself, but in a bigger group, you take as long as you need” (GM, pg. 40). 
By contrast, Gérard Mulliez is highly distrustful of the financial markets: “When I discovered 
the trading rooms, at first I didn’t know what they were doing, these guys who all come from 
the top graduate schools, sitting behind computers, playing with something that doesn’t exist. 
I was astounded.” (GM, pg. 60) And then: “I hope that, after having sorted out the dot-com 
bubble crisis, after the crisis here,37 I hope people will stop playing with things that don’t 
exist. And so they’ll use the money to create proper added value. Because that isn’t adding 
value, it’s just paper.” (GM, pg. 61) “Real value”, from productive investment in companies 
one knows about and in which one is personally involved, is thus contrasted with the “idols” 
of market finance, which creates a virtual reality. 
  
3.2.4. Intentional and specific mechanisms: formalisation of the conception of ownership 
and shareholder relations 
 
A governance system is a whole; its components interact and mesh in a complementary way. 
Intentional, specific mechanisms therefore give a more formal character to top managers’ 
values. 
 
Wills 
One of the primary intentional mechanisms specific to the Mulliez family’s companies are the 
wills, which formalise the conception of ownership handed down by the family culture: 
“In his will, made long before he died, my father gave us ownership of the shares. I have 
transferred mine to my children in 1975, and my parents had done the same for me in 1939-
1940. In his will, and in the documents accompanying the gifts by will that were made 
                                                 
37
 The interview took place on 16 October 2008. 
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officially, my father wrote: ‘You are forbidden from selling the shares in the companies, 
except to create a job for one of you or one of your brothers, and providing it is with the 
consent of at least two of your brothers, in order to prevent dispersion, bouts of over-
enthusiasm, etc.’. […] And I believe that this is important because it proves, if you will, that 
we are not owners, we are managers of a good in this world. We will be judged accordingly 
when we reach the other side, and it doesn’t belong to us. This means that selling shares to 
pay for girls is [dumb], it makes no sense. Selling shares to buy a boat is questionable. Selling 
shares to play the stock market, I did it once and I lost. […] every time I’ve overstepped the 
mark, my father up in heaven, and even when he was there, … I’ve lost. And so I was cured, 
because when you don’t take care of business, it doesn’t run properly. » (GM, pg. 29) The 
spirit of the will, as perceived by Gérard Mulliez, clearly reflects the idea of the universal 
destination of goods. 
 
The family association and its internal rules 
The family shareholders’ relations are also formalised to a degree within the Mulliez family 
association (AFM), although from a legal perspective this body does not really exist (it is not 
a non-profit association under the French law of 1901). However, it has a code of conduct, 
first written in the generation of the Auchan founder’s parents: “These internal rules stem 
from what our parents were, what my grandfather was, what my parents were, from my father 
and his brothers, and what we are. The rules have evolved over time, because when there were 
ten partners it wasn’t the same as when there were thirty, which wasn’t the same as the five 
hundred there are now. When there were two companies, it wasn’t the same as the large 
number we have now.” (GM, pg. 6). 
These rules derive from a joint agreement between the association’s members, and are 
informed by the strong Catholic culture of the first drafters:  
“They made the rules together, so they convinced one another round a table. I attended the 
introduction of the first set of rules. We met from eight o’ clock to noon every Saturday 
morning, and we read them line by line. My father often invented the lines, and my father’s 
youngest brother, Francis Mulliez, did the final draft. He would read out a sentence, and say: 
‘Do you all agree?’. They said ‘yes’ or ‘no, couldn’t we change this or that?’. And so we 
gradually absorbed them. Also, my father and his brother Louis were part of the Catholic 
action network with priests, Jesuits and others who were quite remarkable. Father Ranson also 
made a big impression on them. And so they really worked hard. (…) Spirituality… The 
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chaplain went into the details of how companies were organised. So they worked on that and 
then they applied it.” (GM, pg. 11). 
 
Employee share ownership 
Besides the sense of responsibility attached to ownership by family shareholders, the 
Church’s social doctrine defends the possibility of access to ownership for the greatest 
number. We have already mentioned that this element of the SDC was a decisive factor in the 
introduction by Auchan of employee share ownership. Here, we will simply state that when 
the scheme was put in place, Auchan had a big lead in this area, and even today, an employee-
owned equity stake of about 13% is highly unusual for a group of this size. 
Asked about the reasons for employee share ownership, Gérard Mulliez replies: “Well, it’s 
both fair and effective”. (GM, pg. 61)  
 
Supervisory board  
Owing to their equity stakes, which are managed by a body called Valauchan, the employees 
have a representative on the supervisory board. He is the president of Valauchan International.  
Otherwise, the supervisory board has an empirical structure; the spirit is not one of suspicion 
of potentially dishonest behaviour that requires monitoring (as the mainstream approach to 
governance would have it). On the contrary: the idea is to provide assistance, so as to make 
sure projects are viable: 
“In our group, the principle is that each management team must have a so-called supervisory 
team opposite. It would have been better to talk about assistance, but in the end we used the 
term supervisory […] The idea being that the supervisory team plus the operational team do 
better together than if it didn’t exist. And that one team’s human resource professional can 
give their HR tips to their counterpart. […] The boss is always a guy who’s a boss because he 
has some distinctive quality. Generally, he’s unbeatable in his area, but has lots of gaps 
everywhere else. So we have to help him to surround himself with experts from the other 
areas – that’s important, it’s one of the board’s roles. And it’s one of the board’s roles to train 
the people around the management team in the specific areas. So it’s a system which means 
that every month people have to meet, and every month each of the company’s major 
functions is reviewed.” (GM, pg. 64-65)  
And then: 
“So, it’s important to have these advisers and this wealth of expertise which was put in place 
to supervise us. That’s how it started. One of my uncles used to come and bother me every 
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month, and when I explained things to him, he wouldn’t believe me. So I said to him: ‘Right, 
you won’t believe me, let’s call in Roger Brouwers’, who was the finance director, 
Marc Deleplanque, the development director, Philippe Duprez, the human resources director. 
[…] so the poor bloke found himself up against four guys who had a certain amount of power. 
They weren’t fools. And then he said: ‘I can’t keep coming on my own like this, no way, I’m 
going to be tricked’. So he brought along other people, other business chiefs, other family 
cousins, so that it would be four against four. And that’s become the rule we’ve applied in the 
big companies and the little ones too.” (GM, pg. 65) The board directors are not therefore 
recruited for their independence, but for skills that help develop the group on healthy 
foundations. 
 
Remuneration systems  
The remuneration policy for top managers belonging to the family was at first heavily 
determined by the needs of family life: 
“They used to be told: “Your wage will depend on how many children you have, because it 
depends on how much money you need to live on.” (GM, pg. 8) 
This corresponds to the notion of the “just wage” defended in the SDC, as defined with 
reference to the family’s needs to ensure a decent existence. Otherwise, Gérard Mulliez 
considers that basic salary must reflect a certain moderation: 
“The top managers must have reasonable basic salaries, […] the rest of their remuneration 
must be a profit-sharing system. I always say that basic salary is taken from the checkout 
girl’s pay. The profit share is taken from the organisation’s intelligence and a little bit from 
the shareholders. That doesn’t really matter. And having top managers who are overpaid even 
if they’re losing money is out of order. These are rules, and they must be applied.” (GM, pg. 
58) 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our analyses reveal deep traces of the Church’s social doctrine in the comments of Gérard 
Mulliez, founder of Auchan, one of France’s biggest retail groups. This doctrine’s value 
system is invoked to justify governance choices that in some cases differ significantly from 
the currently dominant model of corporate governance, which was devised solely to protect 
the financial interests of a dispersed, anonymous shareholder base that operates in the stock 
market. The group’s upper echelons – who embrace a conception of ownership coupled with 
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social duties as well as rights, with regard to a company that is conceived as a human 
community – have to date deliberately opted to stay out of the financial markets, in order to 
keep the equity base heavily concentrated within the founding family, supplemented by a 
significant employee-owned shareholding. It is therefore not by default that Auchan’s 
governance system deviates from the benchmark financial model, owing to the supposed 
inability of French law to effectively protect financial investors (LLSV, 1998), but by choice; 
and the group’s founder stands firmly by this choice, on the basis of the Catholic Church’s 
social teaching. 
It is noteworthy, however, that our findings do not make it possible to state that Auchan fully 
reflects all SDC principles in its applied practices; or that the group may be viewed as the 
archetype of a business governed in accordance with the precepts of the Church. This paper 
has a far more modest purpose: to show that, in spite of occasionally strong contingencies, 
such as high institutional pressure based on a standard economic discourse that seems to 
impose itself isomorphically, differences still exist between company governance schemes 
within the same economic region and are self-sustainable for long periods, as illustrated by 
the Auchan group’s lifespan. This observation demolishes the theory that governance 
systems38 are inevitably converging into a single financial model, and rebuts the idea of pure 
institutional determinism. A non-mainstream model can be chosen freely, because this choice 
is based on an alternative value system endorsed by the main top managers. In the specific 
case of Auchan, this value system refers to the SDC, whose specific conception of private 
property guided the unrestricted search for concrete solutions for various aspects of 
governance. 
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Appendix – What is the Church’s social doctrine?39 
 
In 1891, in his encyclical “Rerum novarum” – “Des conditions nouvelles sur la situation des 
ouvriers”  
- Pope Leo XIII expressed his concern about the effects of capitalism and liberal economics 
on the structures of society: growing urbanisation fed by the rural exodus; loss of the 
traditional solidarities, typically organised under the aegis of parishes; pauperisation and 
receding Christian faith among the working class; dissemination of socialist ideas. This 
document began a series of texts on economic and social matters, called the Social Doctrine 
(or Teaching) of the Church.40  
 
However, the Social Doctrine of the Church (SDC) is not a political programme. It seeks to 
set out major moral principles, based on a Christian conception of humanity and a vision of 
society that is subordinated to the idea of justice, in order that Christians may address with 
discernment and commitment the dilemmas posed by business and social life. The discourse 
draws on permanent elements – the central concept of personal dignity41 and the revelation of 
natural law42 – which ensure the unity of documents that are regularly updated to take 
account of new problems.  
                                                 
39
 The text in the appendix borrows from the entry on the Social Doctrine of the Church in Dictionnaire du 
Catholicisme, due to be published in early 2012, Paris, Robert Laffont, Collection Bouquins. 
 
40
 These texts (encyclicals for the most part) are typically published on the occasion of 10-year anniversaries of 
Rn. Thus: Quadragesimo anno (on reconstruction of the social order), Pius XI, 1931; the message broadcast at 
Whitsun 1941 by Pius XII; Mater et Magistra (on the contemporary development of social life in the light of 
Christian principles), John XXIII, 1961; the apostolic letter Octogesima adveniens (in response to the new needs 
of a changing world), Paul VI, 1971; Laborem exercens (on human work), John Paul II, 1981; Centesimus 
annus, John Paul II, 1991. Other documents make a major contribution to social thinking: the encyclical Pacem 
in terris (on establishing universal peace in truth, justice, charity, and liberty), John XXIII, 1963; the conciliar 
constitution Gaudium et Spes (on the Church in the modern world), 1965; the encyclical Populorum progressio 
(on the development of peoples), Paul VI, 1967; and the encyclical Sollicitudo rei socialis, John Paul II, 1987, 
for the 20th anniversary of Populorum progressio. The Synod of Bishops published an important document in 
1971, Justicia in Mundo, while the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, at John Paul II’s request, gave a 
thematic presentation in 2005 of the fundamental points of social teaching in a Compendium of the Social 
Doctrine of the Church. The popes repeated the ideas set out in the encyclicals in countless speeches, messages 
and addresses. The Roman magisterium is supplemented by initiatives, at local-Church and bishop level, on the 
occasion of pastoral letters devoted to economic and social issues, such as that by the American bishops 
(Economic Justice for All, on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, 1986). 
41
 “Men and women, in the concrete circumstances of history, represent the heart and soul of Catholic social 
thought. The whole of the Church’s social doctrine, in fact, develops from the principle that affirms the 
inviolable dignity of the human person” (Compendium, § 107). 
42
 “[The SDC] shows above all the continuity of a teaching that refers to the universal values drawn from 
Revelation and human nature. For this reason the Church’s social doctrine does not depend on the different 
cultures, ideologies or opinions; it is a constant teaching that ‘remains identical in its fundamental inspiration, in 
its “principles of reflection”, in its “criteria of judgment”, in its basic “directives for action”, and above all in its 
vital link with the Gospel of the Lord’. This is the foundational and permanent nucleus of the Church’s social 
 39
This message from the Church, addressed to the temporal world, reflects a somewhat 
ambiguous position, as noted by Pierre Manent, in whose view the Church gives a 
contradictory definition of itself. Granted, it unceasingly reminds us that it has no 
organisational model of society to promote; granted, it asserts a clear separation of the 
temporal and spiritual spheres, and even more strongly since the Vatican Council, because 
the kingdom that it heralds is not of this world, but its teaching is intended for this world, and 
so evidently that the Church feels it has not only a “right of inspection” but also and 
especially a “duty of inspection” if the promised salvation is in jeopardy. As political, social 
and economic actions carry heavy consequences, the Church can justify its interventions ad 
infinitum.43   
The SDC holds the liberal individualism of the Enlightenment and socialist atheism 
responsible for economic and social disorder, which explains its intrusion into economics: in 
the Church’s view, the former laid the foundations for the pre-eminence of the competitive 
market economy, thus impairing the ability of morality and politics to regulate modern society 
without problems of justice; and the latter provided totalitarian answers.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
doctrine, by which it moves through history without being conditioned by history or running the risk of fading 
away.” (Compendium, § 85, quoting from Sollicitudo rei socialis-3). 
43
 We are indebted for this idea to Pierre Manent, Histoire intellectuelle du libéralisme, chapter 1: Europe and 
the theologico-political problem, pg. 17-30, Paris, Calman-Lévy, 1987. 
